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ALCOHOL, RISKS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Thom Brooks
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Forthcoming in Alcohol and Public Policy, ed. Thom Brooks (Routledge, 2014). 
Introduction 
Alcohol occupies an important place in Western societies. It is difficult to imagine a return to 
prohibition as popularity or even possible. Nevertheless, alcohol is often present in crime. Or 
stated differently, many crimes are committed by persons that have consumed alcohol and 
perhaps while under its influence. Alcohol might be considered a double-edged sword as 
something we use when celebrating positive achievements, such as a new job or marriage, but 
also something used where others engage in crime. Perhaps alcohol should be permitted, but 
its use brings risks that may bear on public policy makers. 
This chapter examines the relation of risks and public policy through the lens of alcohol and 
crime. Alcohol leads a double-life as a fountain of celebration, but also a wellspring of 
potentially serious harms. Our question is how associated risks from its use might be 
managed much better. This question is approached through considering three different arenas 
each within the broad remit of English criminal law although addressing broader issues of 
criminal justice more widely. The first area is drunkenness and criminal liability. The second 
area considers the option of an additional tax on alcohol per unit. The last arena examined is a 
consideration of whether nudges might be more effect. 
The chapter concludes that the criminal law is a crude mechanism for grappling with complex 
issues of criminal responsibility for any higher risks associated with becoming under the 
influence. In short, the legal position is fairly intolerant and this has advantages in terms of 
administering justice. Higher taxation through so-called ‘sin taxes’ might also bring 
advantages, but there remain serious concerns to address as well. Perhaps an underexplored 
area for public policy decision-making is designing better nudges. This is examined and 
defended below. 
Drunkenness and Criminal Liability 
Let us begin with the use of the criminal law to address problems of alcohol and the risk of 
criminal harms. While the criminal law is a crude mechanism for public policy-making, it 
largely gets the balance correct on the whole. This is not to claim there are no problems and 
will be considered shortly. 
Most non-lawyers mistakenly think the law is essentially retributivist. This is the view where 
criminals are punished to the degree deserved for the harms they expose or inflict to others 
(Moore, 1997). One problem with this view is that it assumes a strong connection between 
desert, understood as ‘moral responsibility’, and harm. This is captured in a crime, such as 
murder where there is a requirement of specific intent connected to the cause of someone’s 
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death. But how to balance high moral responsibility for low risk of harm or low moral 
responsibility for high risk of harm? Retribution lacks clear answers to such cases where 
these elements move in contrary directions (Brooks, 2012). 
But there is a more fundamental problem with the retributivist view of ‘harm’. The kinds of 
harms that occupy the criminal law are not exclusively moral in nature (Brooks, 2013a). Not 
all crimes require proof of moral responsibility. One illustration is crimes of strict liability, 
perhaps the most numerous kind of criminal offence. Strict liability crimes include traffic 
offences (including illegal parking and speeding)  and drug offences (such as heroin 
possession) where the offence is proven where there is evidence someone, in fact, drove a car 
beyond a clearly demarcated speed limit or was found to possess heroin. Broader 
circumstances pertaining to moral decision-making are irrelevant for confirming these 
offences. 
Nonetheless, retribution exercises a powerful grip on the popular imagination and not without 
good reason. There are less numerous, but more serious crimes where moral responsibility 
can play an important role in helping us determining whether that crime was committed. Plus, 
the moral responsibility of offenders also pertains to our assessment of harmful risks. So for 
example arson is a crime with a potentially significant prison sentence for arsonists because 
arson is no mere mistake, but a purposeful activity and it includes a view to its potentially 
deadly risk or exposure to serious harm. The common view that criminals should be punished 
to the degree they deserve for the risk of harms they present to others may be factually 
untrue, but there is some basis in fact among the crimes that grab popular headlines most 
from murder to arson and beyond. 
There are several established links between alcohol consumption and crime (Popovici, 
Homer, Fanf, & French, 2012). For example, both violent and non-violent crimes are linked 
with the density of local businesses offering alcoholic products for sale (Toomey et. al., 
2012a, 2012b), including domestic violence (Livingstone 2011). The evidence is that the 
higher the density of such businesses we can expect to find higher numbers of these offences. 
There is also a more specific link identified between binge drinking and sexual assault where 
the presence of the former is connected with a greater risk of the latter (Abbey, 2002; 
Franklin 2011; Mouilso, Fischer, & Calhoun, 2012; Rothman, Reyes, Johnson, & LaValley, 
2012). We examine approaches to addressing this link between alcohol consumption and 
criminal risks beyond the criminal law in the sections below. Our focus here is on the 
criminal law.  
In England and Wales, criminal offences have three different standards of relevant intent. The 
first we have already considered are crimes of strict liability where no intent by the accused 
need be proven to confirm her conviction for that crime. So the bare fact that a car was driven 
by that person above the clearly demarcated speed limit is necessary and sufficient to secure 
conviction for this crime. Strict liability crimes are the majority of offences found in the 
criminal law. 
Other offences are divided roughly into crimes of specific or basic intent. Crimes requiring 
proof of fault, or mens rea, are at least crimes of basic intent. So a person can be convicted of 
wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm (s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
(OAPA) 1861) through the bare fact that this person was responsible for causing such harm 
to another. This is an example of a crime of basic intent. A crime of specific intent is where a 
more narrow and particular intention is required to prove the offence. An illustration is 
wounding, or causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm (s18 of 
OAPA 1861). This crime is different in kind because it rests not on the bare fact that the 
accused caused harm, but that he intended to cause the harm which transpired. This 
difference is captured by the fact that crimes of basic intent often have lower maximum 
tariffs than crimes of specific intent. So causing grievous bodily harm to another (without 
specific intent) does have a less punitive maximum sentence than causing grievous bodily 
harm with an intent to do so. These different offence types possess different possible 
outcomes. It could be argued one reason for this difference is the fact of a specific intent to 
do harm to others makes the activity of greater potential harmful risk in keeping with a 
broadly retributivist perspective. 
The consumption of alcohol is relevant here because it can affect convictions for offences. 
Intoxication can negate specific intent, but not always. That someone is drunk and engages in 
harmful conduct under the influence of drugs or alcohol can mean this person receives a 
conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not intending to do so. However, if this 
person possessed the intent to cause harm to another prior to intoxication, his being 
intoxication would not negate the specific intent he has: intoxication can be a barrier to 
creating new specific intents, but it need not erase existing specific intents already 
possessed.
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The wider point is that voluntary intoxication is no defence to convictions for crimes. 
However, this can be a mitigating factor when determining sentencing and other criminal 
justice outcomes. Being under the influence is no legal excuse for engaging in criminal 
activity in general. This may run counter to popular perceptions about retribution and moral 
responsibility. It might be asked: how can someone be fully responsible for their actions 
when under the influence of drugs and alcohol?  
The law’s answer is that we hold others to account for the exposure or imposition of harmful 
risks with only narrow exceptions. It is because intoxication is so often present in criminal 
cases that it can play little, if any, factor in confirming convictions and generally only 
relevant for sentencing.  
The law does make an exception for involuntary intoxication, but such cases can be rare and 
there are a number of conditions. For example, someone is involuntarily intoxicated if he is 
intoxicated unknowingly, but not if he is knowingly consuming an intoxicating substance. So 
a person is involuntarily intoxicated if they think they are drinking pure orange juice when it 
is, in fact, spiked with vodka. But this person is not involuntarily intoxicated if they think 
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they are drinking beer when it is, in fact, spiked with vodka or whiskey. When a person is, in 
law, involuntarily intoxicated, this can provide evidence to help establish a full defence, such 
as automatism (Law Commission, 2009). Note that a person is not involuntarily intoxicated 
in law every time he or she is intoxicated unknowingly, such as where a known alcoholic 
product has been spiked to make it more potent. 
Alcohol is demonstrated to have links with risks, such as higher risks of criminal offences. 
The criminal law allows only a narrow exception for cases of involuntary intoxication. 
Otherwise, drunkenness is no excuse and persons under or not under the influence can both 
be held criminally liable for al strict liability and basic intent offences. 
 
Reducing Risks through Higher Taxation 
A second option for reducing risks is so-called ‘sin taxes’. Or, more specifically, an 
additional or higher tax on alcoholic products. The argument is that higher prices will lead to 
less demand as scarce resources are spent on goods other than alcoholic products. There is 
evidence that such efforts can improve public health. One study found raising the price of 
alcoholic products by 6% led to reduced injury deaths by 4.5% (Cook and Durrance, 2013). 
Another study found 1% increase in the cost of alcoholic products led to an increase of nearly 
6.5 days where no alcohol is consumed (Byrnes, et. al., 2013). The evidence is clear: higher 
prices will lead to less consumption and less consumption will lead to fewer alcohol-related 
problems. So is higher taxation the answer? The answer may not be so conclusive. 
The taxation of alcohol is usually defended as a tax on per unit of alcohol in a product. The 
effect is to increase the cost of alcoholic products with a greater impact on products with 
higher units of alcohol. So a bottle of wine (about 9 units) would face a much higher cost 
increase than a pint of weak ale (2 units) (NHS, 2013). Adding a tax of £1 per unit would 
increase the average cost of a bottle of wine from about £5 to £14 and increase the average 
cost of a pint of ale from about £3 to £5. 
An increase in the price of alcoholic products per unit could be an effective policy solution if 
the use of certain alcoholic products were strongly linked with criminality. But there is no 
such established link between the higher the units of alcohol in a particular alcoholic product 
and risk of criminal activity. In the absence of more specific information, increasing the price 
of units can be a crude device for driving down alcohol consumption overall. But a more 
effective policy aiming to reduce risks and criminal activity might more clearly target those 
products most associated with the problem to be tackled. And it is likely true that those 
products most affected, such as a bottle of single-malt whisky, might be less associated with 
criminal behaviour linked with alcohol use than products with fewer units.  
If we accept that the more units of alcohol a person has consumed and so the more likely he 
is to engage in criminal activity, then what should be our policy? It would appear that 
ensuring individuals consumed less units would contribute to less criminal activity. But that’s 
only at the macro level looking across individual activity as a whole without looking more 
carefully at their particular behaviours. What we require is a more specific link between types 
of products and crimes. The point is that it may be more effective to target the potential risks 
from using specific products to better pinpoint improvements to addressing criminal activity. 
The issue is not only that alcohol is consumed as different alcoholic products may expose 
individuals to different risks than others independently of their alcoholic strength. There is a 
need to better identify links at the micro level between product types and criminal offence 
types. So perhaps less alcohol consumption at a macro level can lead to improvements in 
public health for many individuals, this remains a crude mechanism for addressing the 
different risks from different products. Or stated differently: perhaps improvements in public 
health and criminal justice policy at a macro level can be achieved by a blanket imposition of 
higher taxes per unit because this help cause less consumptions of units across the population. 
This mistakes the problem as higher unit consumption in general where the problem might be 
the consumption of specific product types in particular.  
This reveals a second type of taxation. Recall the first type is to increase the costs of 
alcoholic products in relation to their alcoholic strengths by a tax per unit. This one-size-fits-
all approach fails to address the very different effects and potential risks that different 
products might have independently of their alcoholic strength. The second type is to increase 
costs, to reduce availability, of specific types of products.  
Suppose one product (a) has twice the alcoholic strength in a serving than a second product 
(b). Should a be taxed higher than b? One reply is yes so that macro levels of alcoholic 
consumption are reduced. And perhaps this is the easiest, if more crude, way of delivering an 
important public good. But a second reply is no and perhaps the situation should be reversed. 
This is because consumers of b are far more likely to engage in riskier behaviour and criminal 
activity. So the reduction of alcohol-related risks and crime might be more effective on 
targeting those alcoholic products more associated with crime. Perhaps there would be fewer 
offenders if less units were consumed, but it matters which units of what are consumed if we 
are to more effectively contribute to targeting this problem. 
This is not deny more philosophical issues about the moral justification and desirability of 
minimum pricing through higher taxes on units of alcohol or particular kinds of alcoholic 
products (Saunders 2013). For example, one significant disadvantage of taxation approaches 
in this area is their effects assume a standardized person. Or, in other words, this policy 
assumes we, the citizens affected, occupy a substantively similar position in relation to each 
other. In truth, there may be significant inequality whereby higher prices for consumable 
goods we all enjoy will become no less difficult for some to consume and effectively banned 
for those with less expenditure money. Reducing consumption of certain (or all) products 
might disproportionately affect the lifestyles and/or pursuit of preferred leisure activities by 
some demographics than others. Crime is not only linked with alcohol use and so perhaps 
additional justification is warranted for policies that might contribute to a wider public good 
for all (e.g., less crime) by increasing burdens on some and not all. 
 
Nudges – the Future? 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) have made popular the idea of so-called ‘nudges’ 
exposing the public policy implications of behavioural economics.
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 Thaler and Sunstein 
consider a range of policy proposals for improving public health, individual wealth and 
personal happiness that have attracted much interest and not inconsiderable controversy 
(Saint-Paul, 2011). Nevertheless, one area that is relatively underexplored are the ways 
through which risky, and potentially criminal, behaviour could be better managed through the 
use of nudges.  
One illustration by Thaler and Sunstein of a nudge to reduce alcohol consumption is what 
they call ‘socializing nondrinking’ (2008: 73). They focus on the case study of binge drinking 
by university students. Surveys consistently report a significant problem of such behaviour 
and its effects across campuses. One nudge is to communicate that such behaviour is non-
standard and exceptional. So an illustration would be to advertise that the average student 
drinks only a few units of alcohol per week, for example. The idea is that new students can 
become socialized into risky, binge-drinking behaviour where they perceive such activities 
are normal and common. We can provide a nudge by correcting this information and helping 
them realize that what is normal and common is very different from the perceptions new 
students may have acquired from fictional movies about campus life. If students knew more 
about how other students really are, then binge-drinking would be seen as more exceptional 
and might occur much less often. We can tackle binge-drinking effectively by helping 
students gain more accurate information to permit more informed decision-making. By 
improving information about choices, we can improve the choices made and so reduce binge-
drinking without other interventionist policies. 
But there are other nudges we can employ to help reduce alcohol consumption we will briefly 
survey now. One option is to support new regulations concerning advertising in line with the 
policy to tackle binge-drinking at university campuses. There have been great strides in 
helping communicate the problems of drink driving in recent years and similar efforts can 
and should be fed into informing the public that drinking is a right that comes with 
responsibilities. 
A second option is to reconsider where alcoholic products can be placed in shops. Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008: 1-2) note that children can make more healthy choices about what to eat by 
rearranging their options at a cafeteria. Healthier foods should be placed at the front, at eye-
level and easy to reach while less healthy foods should be placed towards the end of the 
queue and made less accessible. Similarly, alcoholic products can be placed not at eye-level 
and more difficult to access, such as behind a cashier. This does not deny anyone access to 
alcoholic products if they are legally entitled to consume them, but it can be a nudge against 
making such a choice. 
A third option concerns individual sales transactions involving alcoholic products. Many of 
us today purchase products using debit or credit cards. Cashiers have machines where we 
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insert our cards and then sign or enter a pin code to make a transaction. These can be 
reconfigured so that purchases of alcoholic products might trigger a new screen requiring 
confirmation before the purchase is approved, such as asking customers if they are aware 
they are purchasing an alcoholic product or perhaps a general warning about the 
recommended maximum number of units to be consumed in a week. A fourth option is 
improved labelling that more clearly identify potential public health issues and risks. 
The costs of these regulations to consumers and companies trading in alcoholic products 
would be negligible, but the benefits to public health and wider policy could be 
considerable—and without a focus on reducing consumption, but rather improving how 
alcoholic products are consumed. We can provide effective nudges that can reduce 
consumption without reducing consumer choice. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines alcohol and public policy through the dimension of risks and criminal 
justice. While alcohol occupies a central place in ‘our’ celebrations in the West, alcohol has 
similar dominating place in the harms endured by too many through criminal activities. The 
issue concerns drawing lines about how a more satisfactory balance of risks might be struck.  
This issue has been approached here through several angles. The first is the criminal law. We 
have seen that the criminal law is a crude instrument making few exceptions. A second angle 
considered is taxation. We have seen this is often operationalized through a higher tax per 
unit to help cut consumption and contribute to benefit improvements to public health and 
reducing crime. But this is a fairly crude measure as well often aimed at macro level activity 
where a more effective policy should target alcohol consumption at the micro level, such as 
targeting particular kinds of products most associated with problematic behaviours. 
The final consideration is the use of so-called nudges. However else elusive, there are 
underexplored ways through which risky, and potentially criminal, behaviour could be better 
managed through the use of nudges. If we wish to reduce overuse without limiting supply, 
then several options are raised such as new regulations concerning advertising, the place of 
alcoholic products in shops, individual sales transactions involving alcoholic products and 
improved labelling. The costs of these regulations to consumers and companies trading in 
alcoholic products would be negligible, but the benefits to public health and wider policy 
could be considerable—and without a focus on reducing consumption, but rather improving 
how alcoholic products are consumed.  
In conclusion, the argument is not that we should endorse a nudge-only approach to alcohol 
and public policy, but that nudges could and should play a much greater role than they do in 
improving public policy in this area in concert with existing policy concerning criminal law 
and taxation. Together, the risks of alcohol consumption can be better managed if only we 
more willing—and more imaginative—about how we might provide nudges and reduce risks.  
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